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The Diffusion of Financial Supervisory Governance Ideas
Christopher Gandrud∗†
Abstract
Who is watching the financial services industry? Since 1980 there have been multiple waves of thought
about whether the ministry of finance, the central bank, a specialized regulator, or some combination
should have supervisory authority. These waves have been associated with convergence of actual prac-
tices. How much and through what channels did internationally promoted ideas about supervisory “best
practice” influence institutional design choices? I use a new data set of 83 countries and jurisdictions
between the 1980s and 2007 to examine the diffusion of supervisory ideas. With this data, I employ
Cox Proportional Hazard and Competing Risks Event History Analyses to evaluate the possible causal
roles best practice policy ideas may have played. I find that banking crises and certain peer groups can
encourage policy convergence on heavily promoted ideas.
Keywords: policy diﬀusion, event history analysis, ﬁnancial
The 2008/09 ﬁnancial crisis caused policymakers to re-examine both ﬁnancial supervisory policies and the
structure of supervisory governance. One facet of this is a re-examination of the actors that oﬃcially
supervise ﬁnancial institutions.1 Notably, in June 2010 the United Kingdom announced that it would
abolish the previously uniﬁed and specialized Financial Services Authority (FSA) and reassign its functions
to a body based at the central Bank of England. Considering that the FSA was held up as an exemplar of
“best practice” just a few years before, the reform is a dramatic change.
This is not the ﬁrst time we have reconsidered and reformed de jure supervisory governance. Over just
the two decades before the recent ﬁnancial crisis there have been at least two major shifts in ideas and policy
choices about who should supervise the banking and securities industries.2 The ﬁrst was a mixed style where
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the central bank and specialized regulators supervised deposit banks and securities ﬁrms. I call this the SEC
model after the United State’s Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC). Along with the central bank
and other specialized regulators, the SEC supervises the US ﬁnancial industry.3 From 1997, many countries
with a variety of backgrounds–such as the United Kingdom, Germany, South Korea, and Colombia–chose a
diﬀerent approach. They completely separated their supervisors from other institutions and uniﬁed banking
and securities regulation into one authority. I call this the FSA model.
What caused these convergence patterns?
To answer this question I draw on two political economy literatures. The ﬁrst is sociological con-
structivism. This is a broad group that includes work by Blyth (1997, 2002), Chwieroth (2010), Dobbin
(1994), Finnemore and Sikkink (1998, 2001), Jacobs (2008), McNamara (1998, 2002), Windmaier, Blyth and
Seabrooke (2007), and Yee (1996). One important component of this literature is the assertion that new,
socially spread ideas (see Fligstein, 2001) can shape policymakers’ understanding of how policies achieve their
goals. Ideas can change what policies actors are likely to prefer and implement. According to this approach,
the promotion of the SEC or FSA models as “best practice” by prominent and powerful international institu-
tions makes these policies more likely to be adopted. Their promotion may have been particularly successful
because they beneﬁted from the cachet of being associated with Anglo-American ﬁnancial regulatory regimes
(see Walter, 2008) and by tapping into the “independent governance” paradigm that had dominated beliefs
about optimal monetary policy governance since the 1980s (see McNamara, 2002). The result of this process
at the aggregate level is that we observe policy convergence trends.
Simply observing that a speciﬁc policy idea was promoted and that it was followed by an increase in the
proportion of countries with that policy is an important part of arguing that the idea caused the convergence.
This is the time-order criteria. However, just noticing that the time-order criteria has been met is a very
unsatisfying way of making a causal argument.4 Yee (1996) insists that we study the mechanisms linking
ideas to policy choices as well as looking for whether or not the time-order criteria has been met. So,
to evaluate whether ideas inﬂuenced convergence trends I will use the following criteria as my minimum
benchmark:
the observed relationship between possible ideational diﬀusion mechanisms and a given policy
choice must substantially increase soon after a positive idea about the policy begins to be pro-
moted and vice versa for negative ideas.
If the relationships remain largely constant over time then we cannot argue that the promotion of the idea
caused policymakers’ choices. For shorthand I will refer to this as the time-varying criteria. Please note, I
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am not arguing that meeting this time-varying criteria guarantees that an idea caused policy convergence.
It is simply a minimum standard that a causal claim would have to meet.
To empirically test this we need a method that can robustly incorporate time. So, I draw on the growing
policy diﬀusion literature (see Boehmke, 2009, Brooks, 2005, Elkins and Simmons, 2005, Elkins, Guzman and
Simmons, 2006, Füglister, 2011, Gilardi, 2005, Gilardi and Füglister, 2008, Gilardi, Füglister and Luyet, 2009,
Gilardi, 2010, Jordana and Levi-Faur, 2005, Lee and Strang, 2006, Linos, 2011, Meseguer, 2006, Meseguer
and Gilardi, 2009, Shipan and Volden, 2008, Simmons and Elkins, 2004, Simmons, Dobbin and Garrett, 2006,
Strang and Tuma, 1993, Weyland, 2007). This body of work has made considerable progress in exploring
the causes of cross-country policy convergence. Perhaps remarkably for a political science sub-discipline,
it has itself converged on a standard empirical method: Single Transition Event History Analysis (EHA),
primarily the Cox Proportional Hazard (PH) model. This model has numerous advantages for examining
cross-sectional time-series data (Box-Steﬀensmeier and Jones, 2004), particularly how a variable’s eﬀect
changes over time. This quality is necessary for testing the time-varying criteria.
Single Transition EHA nonetheless has diﬃculty incorporating the many initial conditions and choices
that policymakers must consider when changing their ﬁnancial supervisors. There are many institutional
starting points and similarly many new institutions to choose from–the central bank (CB), ministry of
ﬁnance (MoF), a specialized regulator (SR), or some combination. Given this complexity and guided by
data availability I use a pragmatic combination of Cox PH models and Fine and Gray (1999) Competing
Risks Event History Analysis (FG-CREHA). This allows me to incorporate both changes over time and
multiple starting and ending points.
I begin the paper by describing the two de jure ﬁnancial supervisory governance trends from the 1980s
to 2007. In section 2, I discuss hypotheses about the ideational diﬀusion mechanisms and competing non-
diﬀusion factors that may explain or condition these trends. Section 3 lays out the empirical strategy used
to test these hypotheses and gives the results. I use a new data set of 83 countries and jurisdictions’ ﬁnancial
supervisors from 1980 until 2007 for my analysis. I ﬁnd that banking crises and certain peer groups that
actively promote a policy can encourage convergence on heavily promoted ideas, like the FSA model of
ﬁnancial supervision.
3
1 Supervisory Governance Trends
1.1 Who Can Supervise?
Systems of ﬁnancial supervisory governance are often characterized by their position in two dimensions:
(a) the type of bodies that are oﬃcially in charge of inspecting ﬁnancial institutions and (b) their number.
Economists at academic and international institutions have at various times seen both of these as important
factors in the functioning of ﬁnancial regulation. Institutions that are involved in supervision can include the
MoF, the CB,5 or a public body that is specialized to focus only on ﬁnancial supervision. Supervision can
be uniﬁed in one of these institutions or shared between a number of them. For example, the United States
has numerous specialist supervisors, including the SEC and the Commodity Futures Trading Commission,
among others. The Federal Reserve–the CB–also has supervisory powers. The United Kingdom created a
single specialist supervisor in 1997.
1.2 Financial Supervisory Convergence & Ideas
Figure 1 shows the prevalence of certain combinations of institutions in banking and securities regulation
from 1987 to 2007 in 83 jurisdictions.6 Please see Table 4 in the Appendix for a full list of countries in the
sample.7 In Figure 1 we can see two governance adoption trends. Each is preceded in time by the promotion
of international ﬁnancial supervisory governance best practice ideas; the SEC and FSA models.8
[Figure 1 About Here]
1.2.1 The SEC Model Trend (1990 to 1996)
In the period before 1990 some combination of CB-only and CB/MoF9 supervision was clearly the dominant
mode of supervision. From just after 1990 this began to change. CB/MoF supervision decreased in relative
prevalence. At ﬁrst, much of the shift was to systems with some combination of the CB and a SR that
usually focused on securities supervision: the SEC model. By 1996 just under 40 percent of countries in the
sample had SEC-like regulators, almost overtaking CB/MoF supervision. Notably, uniﬁed supervision by a
specialized regulator (the FSA model) was almost non-existent.
The SEC reform trend is further indicated by the changing prevalence of oﬃcial English-language names
given to securities regulators.10 Figure 2 shows the naming patterns. In the late 1980s approximately 90
percent of securities regulators with oﬃcial English-language names did not have at least two words similar
to or forming the same acronym as “Securities and Exchange Commission”.11 In the early to mid-1990s
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there was an increase in countries with SEC names (for example, the Hong Kong Securities and Futures
Commission created in 1989).
A complex version of the SEC model originated in and has been used for a number of decades by a country
with very prominent ﬁnancial markets, the United States. The model’s prominence further increased in the
1980s with the establishment of an international institution that promoted it as best practice. In 1983
the International Organization of Securities Commissioners (IOSCO) was created out of an inter-American
predecessor organization. Around 1990 IOSCO actively promoted the creation of “independent”12 securities
regulators (for example see, Development Committee Of IOSCO, 1990, 5), leaving room for deposit banking
supervision by the central bank or another regulator.
[Figure 2 About Here]
1.2.2 The FSA Model Trend (1997 until at least 2007)
In Figure 2 we can see that shortly after 1997 adoption of SEC-like supervision ﬂattened. From that
point uniﬁed and specialized supervision–the FSA model–began to take oﬀ. This is mirrored in the names
given to regulators (see Figure 2). Before 1997 almost no country had a securities supervisor with a name
similar to “FSA”. However from 1997 the percentage of securities supervisors with FSA-like names increased
substantially. By 2007 around 35 percent of jurisdictions had FSA-like names (for example, Japan’s Financial
Services Agency created in 2000).
This adoption trend was closely preceded by heavy promotion of the FSA model as best practice. From
1997 the IMF, the Basel Committee, members of the United Kingdom’s government, elite academia, and the
business press promoted the FSA model.13 The United Kingdom, a prominent global ﬁnancial center, began
this trend by creating the FSA in 1997 (Masciandaro, Panisini and Quintyn, 2011, 4). UK policymakers
such as Chancellor of the Exchequer Gordon Brown actively promoted it as part of new international best
practice standards from 1997 (Walter, 2008, 23-24). Around this time, many authors in academia and at the
IMF began researching and/or promoting some sort of supervisory uniﬁcation and “independence”. A seminal
paper on the topic was published by Goodhart and Schoenmaker in 1997. It was followed by many other works
(for examples see Goodhart, 2002, Quintyn, Ramirez and Taylor, 2007, Masciandaro, 2006, Masciandaro,
Quintyn and Taylor, 2008). Usually ‘independence’ meant a regulator separate from elected oﬃcials, private
interests, and even the CB (Goodhart and Schoenmaker, 1997, Quintyn and Taylor, 2003).14 The FSA model
was actively promoted by a number of international ﬁnancial institutions as part of a major push in the late
1990s and early 2000s to reform ﬁnancial governance according to new international best practice standards
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(see Walter, 2008, Ch. 1). The Basel Committee for Banking Supervision included the independence idea
as the first of its Core Principles for Eﬀective Banking Supervision. These were released in 1997. The idea
of uniﬁed supervision was also advocated. Principle 20 states that supervisors should regulate banks “on
a consolidated basis,” i.e. across securities and deposit banking. The IMF and World Bank endorsed the
Core Principles in October 1997. From 1999 these two organizations also regularly ran Financial Sector
Assessment Programs that included evaluations of compliance with the Basel Committee’s Core Principles.
The Core Principles were subsequently adopted by the International Association of Insurance Supervisors
and even IOSCO.
The popularity of the FSA model is epitomized by a quote from a former oﬃcial at the People’s Bank of
China. He commented that Chinese policymakers, when considering reforming ﬁnancial supervision, looked
to the “international fashion” leader at the time: the United Kingdom’s FSA.15
2 What Might Explain Convergence?
So far we have established an association between when ﬁnancial supervisory governance best practice ideas
were promoted and policy convergence. Anecdotally, individual supervisors have mentioned diﬀusion as one
of the reasons they were created. The Taiwan Financial Supervisory Commission (a uniﬁed SR), for example,
lists the “Global Trend” as one of the main reasons that it was formed (TFSC, 2010). Nonetheless, we have
only met one basic criteria for establishing plausible causal relationships between ideas and convergence:
time-order.
To make a sturdier causal case, in this section I lay out theoretical arguments for how these particular
best practice ideas could have caused observed convergence trends. I focus on possible causal mechanisms
that can be empirically tested against the time-varying criteria with event history analysis. I also discuss
major competing non-ideational and non-diﬀusion hypotheses.
2.1 Policy Convergence Through Ideational Diffusion
I ﬁrst lay out the general theoretical case for why the SEC and FSA models may have been important causes
of the convergence trends we saw in the previous section. I want to establish a number of empirically testable
hypotheses about the mechanisms through which these ideas could be important.
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2.1.1 Ideas as Causal Models
A large social constructivist literature has established theoretical arguments for how ideas are important
causes of policy change. Brieﬂy, ideas can shape policymakers’ goal-oriented behavior by resolving the
means-ends uncertainty they have about what policy choices are likely to create their preferred outcomes.
Ideas are essentially causal models that link means to ends and suggest what policies actors should choose
to achieve their goals.
Despite multiple waves of best practice recommendations, there is still considerable uncertainty about
supervisory styles’ outcomes and how policymakers should choose between them. Eichengreen and Dincer
(2011) recently found that supervisors separated from the central bank are associated with lower non-
performing loan ratios. This may be because they are better able to overcome the conﬂicting objectives
that central banks face when supervising ﬁnancial institutions and making monetary policy (see Goodhart
and Schoenmaker, 1997, for a discussion). Meanwhile, Masciandaro, Panisini and Quintyn (2011) found
that consolidation and separation are negatively correlated with a banking sector’s resilience after a crisis.
Whether or not a particular governance style is optimal is clearly still an open question not answered by the
empirical ﬁnance literature. Policymakers could not have had full information about what governance type
is optimal during either the SEC or FSA convergence periods.
Nonetheless promotion of best practice ideas could have helped actors believe they were overcoming
this uncertainty. Best practice ideas may work as frames (Tversky and Kahneman, 1981, 1986) that focus
policymakers’ on particular ways of understanding uncertainty problems about how supervisory governance
works and what outcomes are likely to result. Choosing to believe one model over another in turn shapes
what choices policymakers take. Nonetheless, not all ideas are adopted and positively inﬂuence policy change.
Why might the SEC and FSA recommendations have been inﬂuential?
Finnemore and Sikkink argue that “the most important ideational factors are widely shared ‘intersub-
jective beliefs” ’ (2001, 393). Both the SEC and FSA ideas were relatively easy for policymakers to accept,
because they explicitly tied into the broader and already widely accepted “independence” policy paradigm
(see Hall, 1993) that had dominated monetary policy governance thinking since the 1980s (see McNamara,
2002).16 These links were made despite the relative inapplicability of the term ‘independence’ for describing
the suggested SEC and FSA reforms. Independence is awkward for describing SRs, especially compared to
the term’s use in the general political economy literature. It usually refers to independence from political
principals. For ﬁnancial supervision, authors have often used it to mean separation from an already indepen-
dent CB. The term furthermore seems inadequate since the CB and SR often need to work together to share
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information (Goodhart and Schoenmaker, 1997)17 and may have signiﬁcant staﬀ overlap.18 Nonetheless the
term may have added plausibility to the causal claim that separating supervision would result in successful
supervision (see Quintyn, Ramirez and Taylor, 2007, for an explicit discussion of this connection).
Another reason that the ideas may have been accepted more easily by policymakers is that, being based
on regulatory systems in the United States and the United Kingdom they likely gained the ‘prestige and
cachet’ that was aﬀorded to the Anglo-American ﬁnancial regulatory model by the international community
of ﬁnancial policymakers, academics, and private sector actors, especially in the late 1990s (see Walter, 2008).
2.1.2 Mechanisms
Level of Promotion Despite their use of the same independence paradigm and association with presti-
gious Anglo-American institutions, the previous section demonstrated that there was signiﬁcantly less active
support for the SEC model even at its peak in the early 1990s. It appears to have been largely promoted
only by IOSCO. Conversely, the FSA model was very highly promoted by many international organizations
and policymakers in countries with prominent ﬁnancial markets. Using Finnemore and Sikkink’s (1998)
terminology, the SEC idea was promoted from a much smaller “organizational platform”.19 If an idea’s
level of promotion is important for its adoption, we should observe a weaker diﬀusion eﬀect for the SEC
model compared to the FSA model. This leads to the ﬁrst hypothesis that the following ideational diffusion
mechanisms should have a stronger effect for adoption of specialized and unified supervision than CB and
specialized supervision.
Peers & Ideational Promotion A number of theories have been put forward for why policies spread
within a region or between peer groups conceptualized more broadly (see Brooks, 2005, 280-281).20 Formal
peer groups can be organizational platforms that actively promote or discourage certain best practice ideas.
Furthermore, counties may be learning from the experiences of peers who have adopted a given policy. Peers’
adoption of a best practice idea may allow policymakers to examine claims that a supervisory governance
means is at least associated with a policy end in countries with relatively similar conditions (see Meseguer,
2005, Simmons and Elkins, 2004, Volden, Ting and Carpenter, 2008). The more peers that adopt a supervi-
sory model, the more opportunity there is to learn about a promoted policy. Despite the abundance of other
peer hypotheses, We can use the time-varying criteria to determine if peer eﬀects could be an ideational
diﬀusion mechanism. Their eﬀects should change when an idea is promoted.
The peer ideational diﬀusion hypothesis proposes that a jurisdiction is more likely to adopt a supervisory
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model as a larger proportion of their peers adopt it and it is promoted. The probability of creating an SEC or
FSA-like supervisor increases as the proportion of peers who adopt these institutions increases and following
the models’ promotion.
If the proportion of peer adopters is estimated to have an eﬀect, but does not change when the model is
promoted we have evidence for other types of peer diﬀusion processes. Eﬀects that remain the same could
indicate emulation, competition or some other process (see Simmons and Elkins, 2004).
Crisis Diffusion As mentioned earlier, a number of authors (Blyth, 2002, 2003, McNamara, 1998, 2002,
Windmaier, Blyth and Seabrooke, 2007) argue that ideas help actors overcome means-ends uncertainty and
ultimately shape their policy choices. Being in a crisis heightens uncertainty and may make heavily promoted
ideas more attractive. During a crisis it can be very diﬃcult to determine how much the supervisory structure
contributed to the crisis and how it should be changed. This is where prominent best practice ideas may
come in. They help actors interpret what is wrong and suggest solutions to the problem. Walter (2008, Ch.
1) argues that best practice independent supervision was speciﬁcally promoted as a way of understanding
the 1997 Asian ﬁnancial crisis–i.e. as a crisis caused by overly close relationships between regulators and
ﬁnancial institutions–and suggested a solution–de jure regulatory independence. This leads to the hypothesis
that jurisdictions in crisis are likely to adopt a supervisory model when it is heavily promoted.
2.2 Non-Ideational Convergence
Functional Response to Crisis In their study of capital account liberalization Simmons and Elkins
(2004) propose that crisis is not a diﬀusion mechanism, but has an economically functional eﬀect on poli-
cymakers’ decisions to open (or close) capital markets. They hypothesize, that countries with similar expe-
riences with economic shocks will choose the same policy solution: curbing capital outﬂows. They propose
that having a crisis should hinder the adoption of the heavily promoted capital openness policy (though they
ﬁnd evidence that the opposite is true). Likewise countries may adopt certain supervisory styles in crises
because the styles optimally solve their problems. As noted before, there is some reason to be doubtful that
one type of supervisory governance is actually optimal in crises, or at least that policymakers objectively
know what type this is. Masciandaro, Panisini and Quintyn (2011) found little empirical evidence that
FSA-type regulators are actually negatively correlated with banking sector resilience after crisis, despite it
being promoted as a more robust style of supervision. Nonetheless, whether or not policymakers respond to
crisis with supervisory reforms in a functional or ideational manner is an empirical issue which I examine
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with the time-varying criteria below. If actors adopt supervisory reforms in response to crises in a functional
manner we would expect the effect of crises on reforms to be constant over time.
Financial Industry Cross-sector Consolidation One of the primary functional, i.e. non-ideational
arguments for uniﬁed supervision was that as ﬁnancial companies expanded across, sectors supervisors should
or are likely to do the same (Čihák and Podpiera, 2007, Lastra, 2003, Masciandaro, 2006).21 Returning
to the example of the Taiwanese Financial Supervisory Commission, they also highlight ﬁnancial market
consolidation as a reason for creation. Holding aside the endogeneity issue of whether or not the trend
towards consolidation was also the product of ideational diﬀusion–i.e. the idea that successful ﬁnancial
institutions needed to diversify across sectors leading to regulatory changes–supervisory consolidation may
be a functional response to changing economic circumstances. This leads to the hypothesis that jurisdictions
with more consolidated financial sectors are more likely to adopt unified supervision.
3 Hypotheses Testing
Figure 3 shows the number and type of reforms observed in the sample. We can see, for example, that there
were nine instances of supervision being taken away from the CB/MoF and replaced with a uniﬁed and
specialized regulator, the FSA model. In total 19 FSA-type regulators were created. SEC-type regulators
were created 18 times. Every one of these regulatory systems was made by replacing the MoF with a
specialized regulator along side the central bank.
3.1 Empirical Models
When choosing an empirical model we need to keep in mind the total number of reforms we actually observe.
Multiple specialized regulators were only changed to the FSA model. No country got rid of an FSA-type
regulator in this period. Because of these data limitations, I split the analysis into two models for reform
types that have suﬃcient observations to produce meaningful results. In this section I ﬁrst discuss the
statistical methods–Cox PH and Fine and Grey (1999) Competing Risks EHA. Variable descriptions and
results follow. Full replication data and code can be found at: http://bit.ly/Qz7KHt.22
[Figure 3 About Here]
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3.1.1 The Unification of Multiple SRs
I use a Single Transition Cox-PH analysis for transitions where multiple SRs were uniﬁed, since this was the
only type of reform made to these systems. Single Transition EHA is advantageous for studying diﬀusion
because it takes the history of the units of analysis into consideration, primarily through the hazard rate:
h(t). The hazard rate is the rate of an event happening to a unit, such as adopting a certain form of ﬁnancial
supervisor governance, over a very small change in time conditional on the units’ covariates. Formally,
h(t|xi) =
lim
△t→0
Pr(t ≤ Tk ≤ t +△t |Tk ≥ t ,xi)
△t
. (1)
I estimate covariate eﬀects on the hazard rate of transitions between multiple SRs and a uniﬁed SR (the
FSA model) using a Cox PH model (see also Box-Steﬀensmeier and Jones, 2004, Golub, 2008). The basic
Cox proportional hazard rate for the ith unit at time t is given by,
h(t|xi) = h0(t) exp(β′xi). (2)
h0(t) is the baseline hazard at time t, i.e. the hazard rate when all of the covariates x are 0.
3.1.2 Removing the MoF and Possibly the CB from Supervision
Single Transition EHA is conﬁned to questions regarding dichotomous event types, e.g. whether or not
a country liberalizes its pension system (Brooks, 2005) or a country dyad creates a bilateral investment
treaty (Elkins, Guzman and Simmons, 2006). Given that there are relatively many observations on the three
transitions away from CB/MoF controlled supervision, we are able to use competing risks event history
analysis to examine the reasons that policymakers choose one type of reform over the others. There is no
reason to assume that all of the variables will only eﬀect the probability of making one type of reform and
not the others. So, the most appropriate way to examine the covariate eﬀects with competing risks analysis
is with hazards of the sub-distribution (Bakoyannis and Touloumi, 2011, Pintilie, 2007). The hazard of the
sub-distribution23 for transition k at time t (γk(t)) is given by,
γk(t) =
lim
△t→0
Pr(t < T ≤ t +△t , C = k |{T > t or (T ≤ t and C 6= k)})
△t
, (3)
where T is the time of the observed transition C.
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Fine and Gray (1999) developed a Cox PH analogue to empirically model the eﬀect of covariates on the
hazard of the sub-distribution given by,
γk(t|x) = γk,0(t) exp(β
⊺
kx). (4)
γk,0(t) is the baseline sub-hazard analogous to h0(t) from a standard Cox PH model. FG-CREHA allows us
to assess the impact of covariates on choices to reform CB/MoF supervision, given that they have multiple
reforms to choose from and variables may have an inﬂuence on more than one reform choice. See (Gandrud,
forthcoming) for a further discussion of how and when to use FG-CREHA in policy diﬀusion research.
I do not consider reforms of SEC and FSA supervisors since they were reformed very infrequently.
3.1.3 Testing the Time-Varying Criteria
All of the ideational diﬀusion hypotheses predict that the eﬀect of a potential diﬀusion mechanism will
change from the time when a new idea is promoted. To examine whether or not the eﬀects do change we
can leverage a basic assumption of Cox PH and FG-CREHA: the proportional hazards assumption (PHA).
This is the assumption that the hazards/sub-hazards for all units “diﬀer only by a factor of proportionality”
(Chung, Schmidt and Witte, 1991, 71). Box-Steﬀensmeier and Zorn argue that proportional hazards “means
that the eﬀects of covariates are constant over time” (2001, 973). The estimated eﬀects of covariates that
violate this assumption24 likely vary over time. If the eﬀects do vary in this way we can include interactions
with functions of time in the analyses (Box-Steﬀensmeier and Zorn, 2001) to examine whether or not the
variations are consistent with our ideational diﬀusion predictions.
In certain circumstances usual testing the proportional hazards assumption may not give an adequate
indication of whether or not a covariate has a time-varying eﬀect. In situations where we rarely, if ever,
observe an event of interest before a speciﬁc time we are unable to estimate hazards/sub-hazards. This is the
case for transitions to the FSA model in my particular sample. Depending on the competing risk model, we
have very few or no observed transitions before 1997.25 The models cannot estimate the sub-hazards before
this time. Covariate coeﬃcients represent the average estimated eﬀect from 1997 through 2006. If we cannot
estimate the sub-hazards before 1997 then we cannot use traditional PHA tests to examine whether or not
they diﬀer by a constant factor of proportionality at those times. The usual PHA diagnostics could only
examine whether this assumption was violated from 1997 to 2006. If we ﬁnd that it is not, is this evidence
against theories predicting eﬀects that varying over the entire observation period?
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This would not be a valid conclusion. The PHA diagnostics could not test this. In fact the ﬁnding could
provide evidence for ideational diﬀusion hypotheses that predict an interaction between FSA idea promotion
and diﬀusion mechanisms. If we observe no eﬀect followed by a relationship between a given variable and
FSA reforms after 1997 then we could say that the relationship between the variable and the reform changed
over time: it changed from no relationship to a relationship. If the direction of the relationship is the same
as the one predicted by the ideational diﬀusion mechanism hypotheses we would have found evidence for the
predicted interaction according to the time-varying criteria.
To examine this we should focus not just on the traditional tests of the PHA and point estimate tables
where coeﬃcients are averaged over the observation period, but also visually examine how the quantities of
interest–predicted hazard rates26 for the Cox PH model and similar cumulative incidence functions27 for the
FG-CREHA models–change over time.
3.2 Variables
Crisis I gathered data from Laeven and Valencia (2008) on the universe of banking crises over the period
of interest. A number of diﬀerent transformations of this dummy variable were tested to determine the
functional form of the relationship. In this paper I discuss results with a logarithmic transformation of the
variable, crisis(log), that captures a falling of crisis eﬀect over 6 years.28 This variable produced the best
ﬁtting results. It was inspired by Mosakowski (1997) who used a similar decay function. Because of the way
it is constructed low values of crisis(log) indicate high levels of the eﬀect.
Peers One way to test peer eﬀects is through the proportion of other countries in a geographical region
that have adopted the SEC or FSA model, respectively, in the previous year. Unfortunately, though the
sample of 83 countries is wide ranging, it is not exhaustive. A regional proportion of adopters variable
would therefore not actually capture the true regional proportion, resulting in a biased indicator. Instead
variables are based on adopter proportions in select formal and informal peer groups that I have exhaustive
data on and where peer eﬀects are plausibly related to supervisory reforms.29 I did examine an East Asian
peer group,30 which had low levels of formal peer organization, but saw widespread supervisory reforms in
my observation period. Formal peer groups included the Basel Committee, the European Union, and the
Council of the Baltic Sea States (CBSS).31 The last group, founded in 1992, regularly pushed for ﬁnancial
supervisory reforms from the mid-1990s.32
I created Monadic row-standardized spatial effects for each group (see Neumayer and Plümper, 2010a,b).33
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These are equivalent to variables of the proportion of peer adopters in the previous year. I rescaled the
variables to be between zero and 100 to ease interpretation. Note it would be naive to assume that the
peer diﬀusion process would work in the same way across this heterogenous set of peer groups. Instead,
the purpose of these variables is to identify what types of peer groups may have been important for causing
particular reform choices.
Financial Industry Cross-sector Consolidation Firms’ cross-sector ﬁnancial activity is measured using
the asset diversity variable from Laeven and Levine (2007).34 Laeven and Levine created countrywide
unweighted averages of this variable. The measure ranges from 0 to 1. Higher values indicate higher levels
of cross-sector activity. Unfortunately, data was only available from 1998 to 2002 and for 43 countries of
the sample.35 I use Laeven and Levine’s measure of asset diversity averaged within a country over this time
period. A number of robustness checks were completed taking into consideration the potentially limited
applicability of such a measure across the sample. This included constricting the sample and the time period
from 1998 through 2002. However, results did not change substantively.
I also examined other indicators of banking system structure, including deposit bank assets to GDP
(Deposit Bank Assets/GDP) and bank concentration (Beck and Demirgüç-Kunt, 2009).
Other Variables A number of other economic and political variables were added to the analyses to
examine the possibility that the main results of interest were caused by omitted variable bias. These included
GDP/capita in thousands of US dollars (UN, 2009) and CB governor (CBG) tenure in years (Dreher, Strum
and de Haan, 2008, 2010). The latter was modiﬁed so that the ﬁrst year of tenure was coded as 0.5. It was
coded -1 if there was no CBG. Bureaucratic Quality and other International Country Risk Indicators (2009)
were also included as well as various measures of veto players (Keefer and Stasavage, 2003) and democracy
as measured by Unified Democracy Scores (UDS) (Pemstein, Meserve and Melton, 2010). Only results for
bureaucratic quality are included because the others were not robust. As the IMF was a promoter of the
FSA-model and may have used crisis loans to coerce countries to accept it (see Vreeland, 2003), IMF stand-by
agreements from Dreher (2006, updated to 2008) were also used. It was a dummy variable equalling one the
year an agreement was signed and the following year, zero otherwise.
Please refer to the Appendix for descriptive statistics.
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3.3 EHA Results
Time averaged EHA estimated coeﬃcients are shown in tables 1, 2, and 3. I entered the variables sequen-
tially into the models to ascertain possible multicollinearity and identify unstable coeﬃcients (den Poel and
Larivière, 2004). The results tables show a selection of these model speciﬁcations to give you a sense of how
large of a problem this was, especially for variables used to operationalize the key hypotheses.36 In general,
I focus my discussion on coeﬃcient estimates that are robust37 across all models. All models used robust
variance estimates (Cleves et al., 2010, 135) with country-level clusters. Missing data were imputed using
Amelia II by Honaker, King and Blackwell (2010)38 and results tables show averages of ﬁve imputed data
sets using Stata’s mi estimate command with stcox or stcrreg commands depending on whether it was
a Cox PH model or FG-CREHA, respectively. Results for transitions from CB/MoF supervision to only
multiple SRs are not shown because there were few observed transitions in this direction. This transition
type is nonetheless taken into consideration as a competing risk.
[Tables 1, 2, and 3 About Here]
3.3.1 Removing the MoF and Replacing it with SEC-like Supervision
Tests of the proportional hazards assumption indicate that the Basel Committee and East Asia spatial eﬀects,
as well as the IMF stand-by agreement variable had time-varying eﬀects on decisions to create ﬁnancial
supervision involving the central bank and a specialized regulator–the SEC model. Linear time-varying
coeﬃcients (see Stata Corp., 2009, 214-215)39 were added to more accurately estimate the time-varying
eﬀects (see Table 1). I created graphs of the time-varying sub-hazard ratios over time to determine the
direction of the change (not shown, but they can be created with Stata code provided in the replication ﬁle).
The time-varying coeﬃcients for both spatial eﬀect variables fall over time. Around 1990 they both have
a positive eﬀect on removing the MoF from combined CB/MoF supervision and replacing it with a SR.40
But these eﬀects fall and become negative by the mid-1990s. For East Asia this is equivalent to saying
that Hong Kong’s decision in 1989 to adopt SEC-model supervision did not have a positive impact on its
peers’ decisions, because all of them reformed their CB/MoF supervisors before 1997. Soon after 1997 all
of them created either FSA-like or multiple specialized supervision. Among Basel Committee members the
proportion of countries with CB/SR regulation is constant until 1997, when it begins to decline. The decline
is largely because Basel Committee members start to create independent supervisors without central bank
supervision. The Basel Committee did not actively promote the SEC model. In fact, the Basel Committee
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and IOSCO, the SEC model’s main proponent, had relatively conﬂictual relations at this time.41 In many
ways, they were best practice competitors. As such, the Basel Committee may actually have acted as an
organizational platform for arguments that discouraged SEC adoption. Further case study research is needed
to conﬁrm this.
The IMF stand-by agreement had an opposite time-varying eﬀect. It is negative and then becomes
positive from 1997. I found no evidence that the IMF was an advocate of CB/SR supervision across the
observation years. Perhaps, as a general advocate of specialized regulation, especially after 1997, the IMF
may have been satisﬁed if loan recipients removed the MoF from supervision and gave some responsibility
to a specialized regulator, even if the central bank retained some control.
The crisis dummy had no eﬀect. Because of its low level of promotion, perhaps most policymakers did
not consider the SEC model to be a plausible way of calming a crisis.
The main ﬁnding in this analysis has been a lack of evidence for time-constant relationships. Instead
we found evidence that peer spatial eﬀects varied, when we expect that they would given an interaction
with highly promoted ideas. Overall, most of the possible ideational diﬀusion mechanisms were negatively
associated with SEC adoption. This ﬁnding generally conforms to the promotion hypothesis. The SEC
model received little promotion by international organizations and prominent countries. So, we would expect
ideational diﬀusion mechanisms to have a weak impact on adoption. Some unobserved factors likely led to
SEC model convergence.
[Figure 4 About Here]
3.3.2 Unification of Multiple Specialist Supervisors: the FSA Model 1
I did not ﬁnd any violations of the proportional hazards assumption in either of the models looking at
why countries created uniﬁed specialized regulators. As mentioned in the previous section, I expected this
because few countries created this type of regulatory governance before 1997. Such a ﬁnding is evidence for
ideational promotion theories, if the direction of the relationship between the mechanisms and reforms is
also what we predict.
As the crisis diﬀusion hypothesis predicted, crisis(log) has a positive eﬀect on multiple supervisors being
uniﬁed after 1997. Note that the coeﬃcient is negative, but this indicates a positive eﬀect due to the
variable’s scale. Please see the earlier discussion of the variable’s operationalization for details. The crisis
variable meets the time-varying criteria. We can see in Figure 4 that crisis has no eﬀect before 1997,
but then becomes positive after the FSA model is promoted in 1997. This is contrary to the functional
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crisis response hypothesis. Asset diversity does not appear to have an eﬀect on decisions to unify multiple
supervisors. Admittedly, it is poorly operationalized so these results should certainly not be treated as
conclusive. The prevalence of the FSA model among the CBSS, EU, or Basel Committee also does not
appear to have aﬀected uniﬁcation choices for countries that had multiple specialized supervisors, especially
when we control for bureaucratic quality and deposit bank assets as a proportion of GDP.
[Figure 5 About Here]
3.3.3 Unifying CB/MoF Supervision into a SR: the FSA Model 2
Again, as the promotion and crisis diﬀusion hypotheses predicted, having a banking crisis increased the
likelihood of creating an FSA-like regulator if previous supervision had been done by the CB/MoF and the
model was being promoted (see Table 3). We can see this in Figure 5. For countries in crises the probability
of adopting the FSA model is large and increases, but only after 1997 when the idea began to be heavily
promoted. This ﬁts the time-varying criteria. The IMF stand-by agreement variable was signiﬁcant in a
model that did not include crisis. However, it dropped out of signiﬁcance when crises were included. This
suggests that it is the means-ends uncertainty created by crises that may be a mechanism of FSA model
diﬀusion, rather than IMF coercion.
The CBSS spatial eﬀect is positive and very strong from 1997, when the CBSS promoted the FSA model;
also meeting the time-varying criteria. The predicted eﬀect shown in Figure 5 seems comically strong.
However, it is largely depicting empirical reality. Only two–Denmark and Sweden–out of ten CBSS countries
had a uniﬁed SR before 1997. After 1997 only two CBSS countries–Lithuania and Poland–did not have one.
These two had adopted SEC-type supervision in the early 1990s and were therefore not included in this
analysis of reforms made to CB/MoF systems from then on. The reason that the model predicts that all
CBSS members with CB/MoF supervision would choose FSA reforms is that all six of them actually did.
Though this group had no formal power to impose supervisory governance reforms, their recommendations
appear to have been a very inﬂuential channel for diﬀusing the FSA idea. The CBSS promoted the FSA idea
and appears to have been a very eﬀective organizational platform. The other peer groups, however, were
not associated with FSA adoption. We should not be too surprised about this result for the East Asian peer
group as it was not a formal organization. The EU did not actively promote the FSA model. The Basel
Committee did promote the FSA model in its Core Principles for Eﬀective Banking Supervision, but the
results indicate that it did not play much of a role in actual adoption by member countries.
Data (un)availability constrains our ability to fully examine the ﬁnancial sector consolidation hypothesis.
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I ﬁnd no evidence that countries with more consolidated banking sectors were more likely to consolidate their
supervisors. Because the period for which I have data on consolidation is so short, we should certainly not
take this as anything close to deﬁnitive evidence that cross-sector consolidation did not play a role in adoption
of the FSA model. Nonetheless, there are some reasons for believing that the results are not completely
uninformative. I do have data on consolidation for approximately the time period when most of the FSA
reforms were made. Five of the nine reforms of CB/MoF supervisors to the FSA model where between 1998
and 2002, the period we have consolidation data for. Hopefully, more complete data will become available
in the future so that we can more adequately examine the role of cross-sector consolidation.
Conclusion: Did Ideas Influence Financial Supervisory Convergence?
In this paper I have shown how the time-varying criteria can be used as a minimum benchmark for assessing
whether or not ideational diﬀusion aﬀected de jure ﬁnancial supervisory governance convergence trends. I
have also extended the diﬀusion literature’s methodological toolkit by demonstrating how a pragmatic use of
multiple types of event history analysis can be used to examine policymaking in complex choice environments.
What has this approach enabled us to learned about ﬁnancial supervisory governance convergence and
what has it contributed to the broader political economy literature?
I found evidence that the level of promotion is important for whether or not an idea is diﬀused. The
little promoted SEC model does not seem to have been diﬀused through ideational mechanisms, such as
crisis diﬀusion or the peer groups identiﬁed here. Some unobserved factors led to early 1990s convergence
on SEC-type supervision.
The story for the heavily promoted FSA model is very diﬀerent. This paper has identiﬁed a number of
possible ideational mechanisms behind convergence on the FSA model. Banking crises, times of particular
means-ends uncertainty, appear to not have had a uniform eﬀect on FSA reforms over time, even when
controlling for a number of ﬁnancial sector structure factors. According to the time-varying criteria, this
ﬁnding is evidence against a purely functional approach to understanding the impact of crisis. Crises are
associated with reforms in the direction of the strongly promoted FSA idea at the same time that the model
was promoted. Crises appeared to have had no eﬀect on the much less promoted SEC idea. From this
evidence, it seems that in banking crises actors may be more likely to adopt highly promoted best practice
ideas. Certain ﬁnancial supervisory recommendations may actually be functionally optimal. But even if this
was true, and the evidence so far is mixed, clearly all policymakers do not know this at all times. I also
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ﬁnd some evidence for the peer diﬀusion eﬀect, speciﬁcally in formal groups, especially in the CBSS which
actively promoted the FSA idea. More research is needed to understand why the CBSS was much more
successful than the Basel Committee at promoting the FSA model.
Though I found evidence that some ideational diﬀusion mechanisms met the minimal time-varying cri-
teria, due to limited data I was only partially able to examine functional banking system structure causes
of supervisory governance reforms–in particular cross-sector ﬁnancial industry consolidation. Most tran-
sitions to the FSA model were during the period when data was available and results from models with
just this period were largely the same as the entire time span, i.e. no eﬀect. Nonetheless, from the evi-
dence presented here we can not draw any deﬁnitive conclusions about whether cross-sector consolidation,
consistently discussed in the ﬁnancial supervision literature as being an important reason for consolidating
ﬁnancial supervision, was or was not the main driver of supervisory governance consolidation in this period.
The pragmatic event history analysis approach I used in this paper to examine the time-varying criteria
could easily be adopted to study the reasons, especially ideational promotion, for policy choices in a number
of other complex issue areas. Future studies could examine, for example, how ideational diﬀusion may be
important for choices to use ﬁscal stimulus or austerity to respond to economic downturns or the use of
diﬀerent types of bad banks to resolve banking crises.
Notes
1Given space constraints, I focus on changes to the de jure actors who supervise and look at the period up until the recent
crisis. It is admittedly also important to look at de facto governance, regulatory changes, and the economic outcomes of
supervision choices. Hopefully future studies will examine the degree to which my conclusions can be generalized to these areas.
For recent work examining the economic consequences of financial supervisory governance see Barth, Caprio Jr. and Levine
(2004, 2006), Eichengreen and Dincer (2011), Jordana and Rosas (2011), Masciandaro, Panisini and Quintyn (2011), Quintyn
and Taylor (2003).
2Financial supervision broadly encompasses banking, securities, and insurance. However, for simplicity, this paper focuses
on banking and securities both in its discussion and empirical analysis.
3My use of the term ‘SEC model’ refers not only to the securities regulator, but also the fact that some other body is
regulating the deposit banking industry. It describes supervision in both sectors.
4See Blyth (1997, 236) and Yee (1996) for further details of this critique.
5The distinction between MoF and CB supervision may be superficial if the CB is not independent. However I focus on de
jure supervision, because of the difficulty of measuring actual supervisory independence for the wide range of countries in my
sample. A number of measures have been used for monetary policy independence (famously, Cukierman, Web and Neyapti,
1992), but equivalent measures are not widely available for financial supervision.
6Information was not widely available on supervisors earlier than this period. Data was gathered by the author using a
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variety of sources detailed in a data appendix available upon request. The author is indebted to Quintyn et al.’s (2007) work.
In many ways the current sample is an expansion of their sample. An ‘Other’ category, that included up to six jurisdictions
was collapsed into the CB/MoF category.
7The list of sources consulted in the creation of this data set can be found at: http://bit.ly/Qz7KHt.
8It is important to understand the processes behind the creation of these ideas and the reasons that they were promoted. I
touch on some of these issues in this paper. However an in depth study of these issues is beyond the scope of the paper. For
an example of what this research might look like please see please see Chwieroth (2010) for an examination of how ideas have
developed in and come to be promoted by IMF staff.
9Due to a limited number of CB only countries and the difficulty of separating CBs from MoFs when the CB is not clearly
independent, these two categories are combined throughout the paper.
10Focusing on official English names clearly ignores non-English name convergence. Spanish speaking countries, for example
rarely give official English names to their financial supervisors (or have English language version websites). This would certainly
be an interesting area of further study.
11Coding done by the author.
12Much of the literature and documents from government and international organizations on financial supervision uses the
term “independence” (see Goodhart and Schoenmaker, 1997, Masciandaro, Quintyn and Taylor, 2008). This can be a confusing
term since the authors are often referring to making the supervisor independent of a possibly already independent CB. To avoid
confusion, I use the term “specialized” instead. See below for a further discussion.
13Despite the previous moderate SEC model adoption trend, it was so minor that Quintyn, Ramirez and Taylor could argue
in 2007 that the attention given to supervisory governance over the past decade was new:
The discussion about independence, accountability, and more broadly, governance of financial sector regulatory
and supervisory agencies. . . is still relatively new. . . Previously, the organizational structure of supervision had
been widely viewed as a relatively unimportant issue, both in theory and in practice, but this perception changed
dramatically about a decade ago. (2007, 3)
14Note, Goodhart and Schoenmaker (1997) discussed both the potential positive and negative consequences of specialized
supervision. However, this piece is often quoted in later research as advocating unified SR.
15From an interview conducted by the author in Beijing with Zhixiang Zhang on 11 March 2010.
16The recommendations’ timing furthermore closely corresponded to the increasing de jure prevalence of central bank and
regulatory independence in other areas (see McNamara, 2002, Jordana and Levi-Faur, 2005).
17Goodhart and Schoenmaker actually discussed considerable skepticism about the term independence’s appropriateness for
financial regulation. However, in many later works, particularly by IMF staff writers, their 1997 piece is referenced as being a
founding document of the supervisory independence idea (for example Quintyn, Ramirez and Taylor, 2007).
18This is especially true in Northeast Asia. Staff sharing through secondments and agency revolving doors (with both the CB
and MoF) was a common theme in interviews conducted by the author with policymakers and experts in China, South Korea,
and Japan in March 2010.
19Clearly a number of questions could be explored stemming from this discussion. Primarily, why did the FSA model gain
such wide support and usurp the SEC model? This might be a fruitful issue for further study.
20It is common in diffusion studies to include numerous historical, linguistic, and cultural variables. Not only do these, usually
highly correlated variables tend to produce meaningless coefficients (Schrodt, 2006) and suffer from validity issues (how do you
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dichotomously code ‘the religion’ of a society that is almost evenly split between Christians and Muslims, for example), but
exploratory descriptive analysis also indicates that these would not be strong predictors.
21Initially the regulatory capture literature (Stigler, 1971) seems a natural place to look for theories concerning financial
supervision. Private sector capture was certainly a concern of those proposing supervisory separation from political actors (see
Quintyn and Taylor, 2003). However, this doesn’t appear to be likely to explain governance reform choices. If regulatory policy
was already captured by the financial sector, why would they lobby to have it changed? Financial sector structure variables
are included in the models partially to account for potential changes in the power of the sector which might lead them to have
more or less influence over governance choices.
22Please note that International Country Risk Indicators are made available for replication only. They should not be dis-
tributed.
23Covariates are omitted for simplicity.
24We can use a number of PHA diagnostic tests such as residual-based approaches (Box-Steffensmeier and Zorn, 2001, Fine
and Gray, 1999) and time interactions (Stata Corp., 2009, 214-215).
25Only 4 countries in the entire 83 country sample had unified specialized regulators before 1997. Sweden and Denmark
unified multiple specialized regulators in 1991 and 1987 respectively so the are only included in the model Cox PH model of
transitions from Multiple SR to Unified SR Denmark, like all transitions made in 1987, was not ’observed’ by the model because
the year 1986, was not included due to data availability. Honduras and Nicaragua both had unified regulators well before the
beginning of the observation period, so they are not included in the models
26Sometimes also referred to as hazard functions.
27Cumulative incidence functions are the probability of observing the event of interest and not another event before a certain
time, if it hasn’t already happened given certain values of the covariates. Formally: CIF(t|x) = Pr(T ≤ tand event type of interest |x)
(modified from Stata Corp., 2009, 532).
28The specific logarithmic base 10 transformation of the impact of crisis from the first crisis year tc0 to some year tc was
found by, 

log(tc − tc0 + 0.1)− 0.78533 if crisis observed
log(6.1)− 0.78533 if no crisis observed
where tc ≤ tc0+5. The variable was standardized so that 0 signifies no crisis. Because of this, the crisis variable at tc0 =
−1.78533.
29Plausibility was determined by examining descriptive statistics and peer organizations documents.
30China, Hong Kong, Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan
31Denmark, Estonia, Finland, Germany, Iceland, Latvia, Lithuania, Norway, Poland, and Sweden.
32A prime example is found in the communiqué from their 1997 meeting (Council of the Baltic Sea States, 1997).
33The procedure I used to create the dyadic data sets for finding the spacial effects was from Gilardi and Füglister (2008).
34Asset diversity for firms with assets of at least US$100 million is calculated by 1−
∣∣∣ (Net loans−Other earning assets)Total earning assets
∣∣∣ .
35Pakistan and Venezuela, included in Laeven and Levine (2007) were not included in the analysis due to unavailable data
on their financial supervisors.
36Results from models with very highly correlated and insignificant variables are not show. These are discussed in the table
captions.
37i.e. statistically significant at at least the 5% level
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38To assess the imputation results, I ran diagnostic test suggested by Honaker, King and Blackwell (2010) and implemented
in Amelia II, including comparing observed and imputed variable densities and running models with overdispersed starting
values. These methods did not reveal any major anomalies in the imputed data used for this paper’s analyses.
39The estimated linear time-varying coefficients are made up of two parts, a non-time-varying β and a time-varying β(t). So
the coefficient is β + β(t).
Various non-linear functions of time were also tried, but did not substantively change the results.
40The GDP per capita variable was also negative and significant at between the 5 and 10% significance level depending on
the model specification.
41From a discussion with Charles Goodhart conducted 5 October 2010.
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Figure 1: Percentage of 83 Countries with a Given Supervisory Style
The CB/MoF category includes countries with CB-only supervision.
Figure 2: Percentage of Securities Supervisor English Language Names in 83 Countries
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Figure 3: Frequency of Supervisory Governance Reforms in 83 Countries, 1988-2006
The graph shows the supervisory governance reforms observed in the data set. For example, there were nine observed instances of a
CB/MoF supervisory system being changed to a unified and specialized regulator (the FSA Model).
Note: zeros indicate that no reforms of that type were observed.
Figure 4: Smoothed Hazards for Uniﬁcation of Multiple SRs (FSA): Crisis(log) (Model A7)
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Table 1: Fine & Gray Competing Risks Coeﬃcients for Reforms from CB/MoF to CB/SR Supervision (SEC
Model), others competing, 1988 - 2006
Variable A1 A2 A3 A4 A5 A6 A7
Crisis(Log) 1.650 1.514 1.192
(1.109) (1.172) (1.026)
IMF Stand-by −4.053 −4.021 −3.345
(2.938) (3.063) (2.591)
CBSS SE (CB/SR) 0.084 0.176* 0.133
(0.065) (0.099) (0.086)
EU SE (CB/SR) 0.092* 0.089 0.079
(0.051) (0.057) (0.052)
Basel SE (CB/SR) −0.436*** −0.425*** −0.409***
(0.051) (0.056) (0.033)
EA SE (CB/SR) −0.694*** −0.687*** −0.619***
(0.052) (0.069) (0.028)
GDP/Capita −0.062** −0.064** −0.063** −0.065* −0.050* −0.066*
(0.030) (0.029) (0.028) (0.037) (0.029) (0.039)
Asset Diversity −3.225
(2.706)
DB Assets/GDP −0.497 −0.811 −0.534 −0.459 −0.161 −0.023
(0.717) (0.829) (0.726) (0.772) (0.898) (0.974)
Concentration −0.580 −0.221 −0.849 −0.226 −1.255 −0.904
(1.318) (1.374) (1.321) (1.327) (1.663) (1.697)
CBG Tenure 0.052 0.047 0.046 −0.186 0.028 0.030
(0.057) (0.059) (0.056) (0.173) (0.057) (0.070)
Time Interactions
IMF Stand-by 0.369* 0.386** 0.356**
(0.204) (0.195) (0.166)
CBSS SE (CB/SR) −0.013** −0.021*** −0.018***
(0.005) (0.007) (0.006)
EU SE (CB/SR) −0.015** −0.015** −0.016**
(0.006) (0.007) (0.007)
CBG Tenure 0.022*
(0.012)
Countries at Risk 45 45 45 45 45 45 45
No. of Transitions 18 18 18 18 18 18 18
F 1.891 1.529 2.317 2.228 75.663 55.621 116.806
p 0.110 0.179 0.041 0.029 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001
Standard errors are in parentheses. */**/*** at 10/5/1% significance levels. All models were compared to similar models over the
time period 1997 - 2007 to determine if the asset diversity variable produced different results. Diagnostic tests using Schoenfield-
Type residuals (see Fine and Gray, 1999) and time interactions were used to test the proportional hazards assumption. Linear
time-varying covariates were added when the assumption was violated (Stata Corp., 2009, 214-215). Bureaucratic Quality and
Democracy (UDS) were excluded due to high insignificance and high correlation with GDP/Capita.
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Table 2: Cox Proportional Hazard Coeﬃcients For Unifying Multiple SRs (FSA Model), 1988 - 2006
Variable B1 B2 B3 B4 B5 B6 B7
Crisis(Log) −1.569*** −1.529** −1.572**
(0.477) (0.676) (0.776)
IMF Stand-by 2.274 2.101 0.706
(1.918) (1.681) (1.227)
CBSS SE (SR/U) 0.020 0.033 0.052***
(0.041) (0.049) (0.016)
EU SE (SR/U) 0.038 0.052 0.014
(0.034) (0.036) (0.026)
Basel SE (SR/U) 0.013 0.012 −0.002
(0.042) (0.057) (0.032)
Asset Diversity 0.781
(3.170)
CBG Tenure 0.189 0.189 0.151 0.265* 0.159 0.184
(0.170) (0.175) (0.176) (0.143) (0.168) (0.136)
Concentration 0.809 1.085 1.027 0.541 −0.462 −1.595
(1.432) (2.190) (1.411) (1.998) (3.780) (4.748)
DB Assets/GDP −4.407*** −4.521*** −4.375*** −4.322*** −5.445*** −5.442***
(1.128) (1.189) (1.125) (1.177) (1.571) (1.915)
Bureaucratic Quality 2.096*** 2.209*** 2.072*** 2.934*** 2.119*** 2.790***
(0.389) (0.765) (0.314) (0.997) (0.557) (0.850)
Countries at Risk 21 21 21 21 21 21 21
No. of Transitions 7 7 7 7 7 7 7
F 7.980 5.658 12.988 9.754 5.826 8.367 2.984
p <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 0.011
Standard errors are in parentheses. */**/*** at 10/5/1% significance levels. A number of other model specifications were tested
that included variables such as the number of veto players (see Keefer and Stasavage, 2003) suggested by Gilardi and Füglister
(2008). Democracy (UDS) and GDP/Captia were excluded because they were highly correlated with Bureaucratic Quality
(0.413 and 0.734, respectively) and had very unstable coefficients. Bureaucratic Quality was kept in this analysis because it
produced the strongest and most stable results. The spatial effect for East Asia was not included because none of the East Asian
countries were in the risk set apart from China in 2005-2006. Results for models with the Crisis Dummy are not shown because
when included the maximum likelihood estimation failed to converge. Stata’s estat phtest was used to test the proportional
hazard’s assumption.
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Table 3: Fine & Gray Competing Risks Coeﬃcients for Reforms from CB/MoF to Uniﬁed SR Supervision
(FSA Model) others competing, 1988 - 2006
Variable C1 C2 C3 C4 C5 C6 C7
Crisis(Log) −1.152* −1.390* −1.198*
(0.639) (0.808) (0.659)
IMF Stand-by 1.946** 1.761 0.312
(0.852) (1.430) (0.796)
CBSS SE (SR/U) 0.136*** 0.119*** 0.076**
(0.028) (0.028) (0.035)
EU SE (SR/U) −0.059 −0.031 −0.003
(0.058) (0.055) (0.059)
Basel SE (SR/U) −0.107 −0.145* 0.045
(0.072) (0.083) (0.060)
EA SE (SR/U) −0.014 0.004 0.049**
(0.025) (0.029) (0.019)
Asset Diversity −1.151
(3.636)
CBG Tenure −0.054 −0.057 −0.049 −0.058 −0.094 −0.094
(0.077) (0.071) (0.084) (0.090) (0.109) (0.132)
Concentration −1.350 −1.230 −0.925 −0.806 −5.000*** −3.912**
(1.880) (1.941) (1.856) (1.710) (1.799) (1.876)
DB Assets/GDP 0.847 0.790 0.655 1.257* 1.905* 2.036
(0.727) (0.786) (0.734) (0.754) (1.043) (1.383)
GDP/Capita 0.020 0.021 0.029 0.033 0.050 0.079**
(0.023) (0.022) (0.024) (0.021) (0.036) (0.036)
Countries at Risk 45 45 45 45 45 45 45
No. of Transitions 9 9 9 9 9 9 9
F 2.469 1.952 3.630 2.860 5.405 5.237 4.453
p 0.044 0.086 0.003 0.015 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001
Standard errors are in parentheses. */**/*** at 10/5/1% significance levels. All models were compared to similar models
over the time period 1997 - 2007 to determine if the asset diversity variable produced different results. Diagnostic tests using
Schoenfield-Type residuals (see Fine and Gray, 1999) and time interactions (Stata Corp., 2009, 214-215) were used to test the
proportional hazards assumption. Bureaucratic Quality and Democracy (UDS) were excluded due to high insignificance and
high correlation with GDP/Capita.
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Figure 5: Crisis Dummy and CBSS Spatial Eﬀect Predicted Proportions Creating Uniﬁed Supervision (FSA)
from CB/MoF Control Using a Representative Range of Values (Model C6)
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Appendix
Table 4: Country Sample and Supervisor Type (1987-2006)
Country First Year Observed Supervisors Supervisors’ Name Type
Afghanistan 1987 Central Bank/MoF Neither
Albania 1987 Central Bank/MoF Neither
Albania 2006 Central Bank/Multiple Specialized FSA
Argentina 1987 Central Bank/Multiple Specialized Neither
Australia 1987 Central Bank/Multiple Specialized Neither
Australia 1998 Multiple Specialized Neither
Austria 1987 Central Bank/MoF Neither
Austria 2002 Unified Specialized FSA
Bahamas 1987 Central Bank/MoF Neither
Bahamas 1999 Central Bank/Multiple Specialized Neither
Bahrain 1987 Central Bank/MoF Neither
Bangladesh 1987 Central Bank/MoF Neither
Barbados 1987 Central Bank/MoF Neither
Barbados 2001 Central Bank/Multiple Specialized SEC
Belgium 1987 Multiple Specialized Neither
Belgium 2002 Unified Specialized Neither
Brazil 1987 Central Bank/MoF SEC
Brunei Darussalam 1987 Central Bank/MoF Neither
Bulgaria 1987 Central Bank/MoF Neither
Bulgaria 2003 Central Bank/Multiple Specialized FSA
Canada 1987 Multiple Specialized Neither
Chile 1987 Multiple Specialized Neither
China 1987 Central Bank/MoF Neither
China 2004 Multiple Specialized Neither
Colombia 1987 Multiple Specialized Neither
Colombia 2005 Unified Specialized Neither
Croatia 1991 Central Bank/MoF Neither
Croatia 2005 Central Bank/Multiple Specialized FSA
Cyprus 1987 Central Bank/MoF Neither
Cyprus 2001 Multiple Specialized SEC
Czech Republic 1993 Central Bank/MoF Neither
Denmark 1987 Multiple Specialized Neither
Denmark 1988 Unified Specialized FSA
Dominican Republic 1987 Central Bank/Multiple Specialized Neither
Ecuador 1987 Multiple Specialized FSA
Egypt 1987 Multiple Specialized Neither
El Salvador 1987 Multiple Specialized Neither
Estonia 1991 Central Bank/MoF Neither
Estonia 1998 Multiple Specialized Neither
Estonia 2002 Unified Specialized FSA
Finland 1987 Central Bank/MoF Neither
Finland 2003 Unified Specialized FSA
France 1987 Multiple Specialized Neither
Germany 1987 Central Bank/Multiple Specialized Neither
Germany 2002 Unified Specialized FSA
Ghana 1987 Central Bank/MoF Neither
Ghana 1993 Central Bank/Multiple Specialized SEC
Greece 1987 Central Bank/MoF Neither
Guatemala 1987 Multiple Specialized Neither
Honduras 1987 Unified Specialized Neither
Hong Kong 1987 Central Bank/MoF Neither
Hong Kong 1989 Central Bank/Multiple Specialized SEC
Hungary 1987 Multiple Specialized Neither
Hungary 2000 Unified Specialized FSA
Iceland 1987 Central Bank/MoF Neither
Iceland 1998 Unified Specialized FSA
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India 1987 Central Bank/Multiple Specialized SEC
Indonesia 1987 Central Bank/MoF Neither
Indonesia 2000 Central Bank/Multiple Specialized Neither
Ireland 1987 Central Bank/MoF Neither
Israel 1987 Central Bank/Multiple Specialized Neither
Italy 1987 Central Bank/Multiple Specialized Neither
Jamaica 1987 Central Bank/Multiple Specialized Neither
Japan 1987 Central Bank/MoF Neither
Japan 2000 Unified Specialized FSA
Jordan 1987 Central Bank/MoF Neither
Jordan 1997 Central Bank/Multiple Specialized SEC
Kenya 1987 Central Bank/MoF Neither
Korea 1987 Central Bank/MoF Neither
Korea 1997 Unified Specialized FSA
Latvia 1991 Central Bank/MoF Neither
Latvia 2001 Unified Specialized Neither
Lithuania 1991 Central Bank/MoF Neither
Lithuania 1994 Central Bank/Multiple Specialized SEC
Luxembourg 1987 Central Bank/MoF Neither
Macedonia 1992 Central Bank/Multiple Specialized SEC
Malawi 1987 Central Bank/MoF Neither
Malaysia 1987 Central Bank/MoF Neither
Malaysia 1993 Multiple Specialized SEC
Malta 1987 Central Bank/MoF Neither
Malta 2002 Unified Specialized FSA
Mexico 1987 Multiple Specialized Neither
Mexico 1999 Unified Specialized Neither
Morocco 1987 Central Bank/MoF Neither
Morocco 1993 Central Bank/Multiple Specialized Neither
Netherlands 1987 Central Bank/MoF Neither
Netherlands 2002 Multiple Specialized FSA
New Zealand 1987 Central Bank/Multiple Specialized SEC
Nicaragua 1987 Unified Specialized Neither
Nigeria 1987 Central Bank/Multiple Specialized SEC
Norway 1987 Multiple Specialized Neither
Norway 2003 Unified Specialized FSA
Oman 1988 Central Bank/Multiple Specialized Neither
Peru 1987 Multiple Specialized Neither
Philippines 1987 Central Bank/Multiple Specialized SEC
Poland 1991 Central Bank/Multiple Specialized SEC
Poland 2006 Unified Specialized FSA
Portugal 1987 Central Bank/MoF Neither
Portugal 1991 Central Bank/Multiple Specialized SEC
Saudi Arabia 1987 Central Bank/MoF Neither
Saudi Arabia 2003 Central Bank/Multiple Specialized Neither
Singapore 1987 Central Bank/MoF Neither
Slovak Republic 1993 Central Bank/Multiple Specialized Neither
Slovak Republic 2006 Central Bank/MoF Neither
Slovenia 1994 Central Bank/Multiple Specialized Neither
South Africa 1987 Central Bank/MoF Neither
South Africa 1991 Central Bank/Multiple Specialized FSA
Spain 1987 Central Bank/MoF Neither
Spain 1988 Central Bank/Multiple Specialized Neither
Sri Lanka 1987 Central Bank/Multiple Specialized SEC
Sweden 1987 Multiple Specialized Neither
Sweden 1991 Unified Specialized Neither
Switzerland 1987 Multiple Specialized Neither
Taiwan 1987 Central Bank/MoF Neither
Taiwan 2004 Unified Specialized FSA
Thailand 1987 Central Bank/MoF Neither
Thailand 1992 Central Bank/Multiple Specialized SEC
Turkey 1987 Central Bank/MoF Neither
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Turkey 2001 Multiple Specialized FSA
Uganda 1987 Central Bank/MoF Neither
Uganda 1996 Central Bank/Multiple Specialized Neither
United Arab Emirates 1987 Central Bank/MoF Neither
United Arab Emirates 2000 Unified Specialized Neither
United Kingdom 1987 Central Bank/Multiple Specialized Neither
United Kingdom 1997 Unified Specialized FSA
United States 1987 Central Bank/Multiple Specialized SEC
Vietnam 1987 Central Bank/MoF Neither
Vietnam 1996 Central Bank/Multiple Specialized SEC
Zambia 1987 Central Bank/MoF Neither
Zambia 1993 Central Bank/Multiple Specialized SEC
Table 5: Summary Descriptive Statistics
Observed Avg. 5 Imputed
Variable Prop. Missing Mean Min Max Mean Min Max
Crisis(Log) 0 -0.1 -1.785 0 -0.1 -1.785 0
Crisis Dummy 0 0.028 0 1 0.028 0 1
IMF Stand-by 0 0.132 0 1 0.132 0 1
CBSS SE CB/SR 0 2.4 0 33.3 2.4 0 33.3
SR/U 0 3.5 0 88.9 3.5 0 88.9
Basel SE CB/SR 0 4.3 0 36.4 4.3 0 36.4
SR/U 0 2.4 0 41.7 2.4 0 41.7
EU SE CB/SR 0 6.1 0 45.5 6.1 0 45.5
SR/U 0 4 0 45.8 4 0 45.8
East Asia SE CB/SR 0 1.1 0 25 1.1 0 25
SR/U 0 1.1 0 75 1.1 0 75
GDP/capita 0.05 15.504 0.510 70.762 15.645 0.510 70.762
DB Assets/GDP 0.13 0.67 0.164 2.7 0.682 0.023 2.71
Concentration 0.22 0.672 0.196 1 0.685 0.196 1
CBG Tenure 0.06 3.46 -1 29 3.5 -1 29
Bureaucratic Qual. 0.07 2.735 0 4 2.721 0 4
Asset Diversity 0.5 0.613 0.164 0.826 0.65 0.164 1
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